On March 31, the first trilateral summit between the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan will take place in Khujand, Tajikistan. The meeting is of historical importance not only because it is the first of its kind, but because it is a sign of changing times in Central Asia. For decades, the densely populated Fergana Valley has been a site of ethnic conflict and contestation between the Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek peoples. Now, however, there are hopes of putting past grievances behind. Earlier this month, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan concluded a border delimitation agreement that formally resolved the long and thorny border dispute between them.
Paradoxically, the diplomatic breakthrough that will hopefully pave the way to a more prosperous and secure everyday life in the Fergana Valley was enabled by deepening authoritarianism within the region.
The 972-kilometer border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has been a site of conflict in Central Asia since both states gained independence from Soviet Union in 1991. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, several rounds of negotiations have taken place, but until recently around 40 percent of the border had remained disputed. Following an era of frequent local conflicts throughout the 2000s and 2010s, the contestation escalated into brief but intensive rounds of fighting in April 2021 and September 2022. The battles left over 200 people dead and local infrastructure in ruins, especially on the Kyrgyz side. The escalation was accompanied by a total closure of the border, increasingly hostile nationalist rhetoric, and an arms race. Both countries are members in the same security organizations, namely the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (SCO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), but it did not help alleviate tensions.
Against this backdrop, announcements about, first, progress in 2023 and, then, completion of a border delimitation agreement in December 2024 were hard to believe. However, the agreement was indeed sealed by presidential signatures in a pompous ceremony on March 13 and its ratification in parliaments of each state is expected to be a done deal. “The border has been decided forever,” commented Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov ahead of the signing, in response to criticisms voiced by the now former parliamentary deputy Sultanbay Ayzhigitov.
The fate of Ayzhigitov, who was expelled from the parliamentary faction of Yiman Nuru party immediately after he voiced his concern regarding the deal brokered for Bishkek by Japarov’s national security chief Kamchybek Tashiev, demonstrates one aspect of authoritarianism that has played into the making of the border agreement. On the Kyrgyz side, border negotiations were extremely difficult due to the high level of resistance to land swaps from the local population. Until recently, Bishkek had been both unable and unwilling to make concessions at the negotiating table, fearing a political backlash.
Japarov’s authoritarian consolidation has changed the calculus, however. Since ascending to presidency via a popular uprising in 2020, Japarov has cracked down on political opposition, restricted free speech, and curbed the space for civil society activism. Kyrgyzstan’s next presidential election isn’t due until 2027, but it seems that Japarov might seek re-election well in advance. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan’s state capacity has greatly improved thanks to a massive increase in state budget revenues.
The border delimitation negotiations with Uzbekistan, completed in 2022, demonstrated Japarov’s will and capacity to resolve border disputes in a diplomatic fashion while suppressing domestic discontent. The Kyrgyz-Uzbek border delimitation agreement was negotiated in good faith and included mutual concessions. One of the land swaps agreed was the transfer of the Kempir-Abad reservoir to Uzbekistan. However, the ceding of the reservoir faced considerable local and national resistance, to which Japarov responded by detaining more than 20 people on charges of plotting mass unrest and attempting to seize power. Although most of the organizers of the Kempir-Abad movement were later acquitted, the government succeeded in demonstrating its power over the political opposition and civil society.
Unlike Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan has been a consolidated autocracy for two decades already. There, domestic authoritarianism does not play into the dynamics of border negotiations through popular resistance but rather through President Emomali Rahmon’s authoritarian succession planning.
Rahmon has been preparing to yield power to his son, Rustam Emomali, for years. Given that the transition of power will be a delicate moment for Tajikistan’s current autocratic regime, Rahmon seeks to ensure that the country’s external borders are peaceful at the moment of succession. Moreover, it is possible that he has only come to view Japarov as a credible interlocutor since he centralized power and demonstrated his readiness to suppress local discontent to a negotiated treaty by force if need be.
Authoritarian governance may have ushered in the border deal, but on both sides of the border it is likely to cause major problems later. Now that the border delimitation has been completed, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will proceed to the next phase of border demarcation, which means the marking of the boundary on the ground.
First, public grievances remain. Given the distinctively authoritarian method of negotiating, the people in border communities were given no chance to participate in the process. As a result, the whole deal can be perceived as unfair and, even worse, illegitimate. It is uncertain whether local resistance will fully dissipate over time. Resistance on the ground can emerge spontaneously, take authorities aback, and escalate into a nationwide protest movement threatening regime stability, especially in Kyrgyzstan.
Second, border demarcation and subsequent border management requires multilevel inter-state collaboration in numerous issues, such as water sharing. Given the lack of such experience, rampant corruption, and communication challenges, ensuring success on the ground can be challenging for both governments. Initial reporting from the ground suggests that years of conflict have generated a deep sense of mistrust in border communities on both sides. In the worst-case scenario, the lack of trust will block cross-border collaboration, and the lack of cooperation will in turn feed into a growing sense of mistrust. In a vicious cycle of this kind, the next border conflict will only be a matter of time.
The formal resolution of border disputes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan demonstrates that Central Asia’s autocratic leaders are able to negotiate mutually acceptable deals with one another. Hopefully they will understand that the only way such agreements can make their way from formal documents to the grassroots level is to include the sidelined local communities in the process before it is too late.
Authoritarian consolidation might have accelerated border deal-making on the paper, but it may also impede deal-making on the ground.
